Part 3: Regional Pushback against Chinese Aggression
Presidential hotline established after latest PH-CN clash; previous 2023 “maritime communication mechanism” after Second Thomas Shoal confrontation failed as Chinese were unreachable: https://indianexpress.com/article/world/new-deal-establishes-hotline-china-philippines-president-clashes-sea-9457335/
Introduction
The increasing aggressiveness of China’s maritime strategies has led to growing resistance among its neighbours in the South China Sea (SCS). These countries have become more vocal and proactive against Beijing, employing various strategies to counter Chinese coercion. Some of the notable strategies employed include public information campaigns, international support, enhanced maritime security, bilateral and multilateral cooperation, defense investments and, international efforts and naval diplomacy.
Public Information Campaigns
The media plays a vital role in shaping the narrative, garnering great support from the global community and putting pressure on Beijing to adhere to international norms.
Foreign Ministers/Foreign Ministries/Ambassadors must also engage with their international counterparts and the diaspora to explain the situation China is creating for them. Print, online and social media must highlight stories emphasising China’s tactics.
Countries like Vietnam and the Philippines have successfully used public information campaigns to highlight Chinese aggression. By documenting and publicising incidents such as the use of military lasers and water cannons against their fishermen and maritime security forces, these nations have drawn international attention to Chinese tactics. This has garnered greater support from the global community, putting pressure on Beijing to adhere to international norms. Public information campaigns are just one reason for international support against China’s hegemonistic ambitions in the South China Sea.
International Support
The involvement of external powers – particularly the United States – Japan and Australia – has been crucial in balancing Chinese ambitions. The regional presence of US and Japanese naval forces serves as a deterrent to unchecked Chinese expansionism and provides support to regional states in defending their sovereignty. Historically, India has also The Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy emphasises the importance of maintaining a rules-based international order and freedom of navigation in the region.
Southeast Asian nations have also invested heavily in enhancing their maritime security and defense capabilities. This includes expanding maritime security engagements and fostering greater cooperation with like-minded countries.
Indonesia:
Pending authorisations from Indonesian authorities, Jakarta and Rome have just concluded a deal worth $1.3 billion for two multipurpose offshore patrol vessels for the Indonesian Navy. This acquisition will only enhance the Indonesian Navy’s capabilities and capacities to counter the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the SCS, also serving as a deterrent mechanism. It will also be interesting to note the manner in which the PLAN’s conducts its forays close to and into Indonesian waters once the Italian vessels begin operations with the Indonesian Navy.
Brigadier General Edwin Adrian Sumantha (head of the Public Relations Bureau, Secretariat General of the Indonesian Ministry of Defense) stated that this deal also includes “… a comprehensive offset package…” in the form of “… shipyard development consultation, long-term business strategy, physical improvements to the shipyard, delivery of didactic material, as well as a six-month training course in Italy”.
In the past, Indonesia has permitted Indian Navy (IN) vessels to dock in Sabang Port for Operational Turnarounds (OTR). The most recent docking was in 2023 and was the first time an IN submarine did its OTR there. New Delhi is in talks with Jakarta to improve the facilities at Sabang Port. The Sunda Strait is of strategic importance as it is one access point to the South China Sea, as well as to Sabang Port. Indonesia is conducting a tight-rope act between India and China, having to weigh such decisions against other options.
One decision Jakarta is considering is increasing its import duties on goods originating from China from 100% to 200%. Chinese imports are far more competitive than Indonesian products. It is believed that this policy is being considered primarily due to domestic concerns of layoffs in the Indonesian textile industry.
The Philippines:
The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) increased the number of drills and exercises conducted in 2023 with neighbouring countries. The Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) have also engaged in military collaborations with other countries to enhance their capabilities and deter Chinese aggression. In early 2023 for instance, the AFP successfully removed a Chinese floating barrier from within the internationally-recognised Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Philippines. Following the Ayungin Shoal attack of June 2024, Manila and Beijing established a hotline between the two presidents. The 2024 national budget will enable the PCG to conduct more maritime patrols by procuring three additional ships totalling US$108,000.
Security cooperation between Philippines and Vietnam, Japan and the US is discussed to analyse Manila’s importance in the region against Beijing’s ambitions in the region.
Philippines-Vietnam:
During the January 2024 visit of Philippine President Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos Jr. to meet Vietnamese President Vo Van Thuong in Hanoi, Manila and Hanoi signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on maritime cooperation, aimed at strengthening mutual understanding, trust and cooperation to protect their interests in the SCS. This was President Marcos’ first visit since assuming office as the President of the Philippines, highlighting the importance the Marcos administration places on Vietnam.
When it comes to the South China Sea, both states committed to maintaining and promoting peace, security, stability, safety and freedom of aviation and navigation by exercising restraint, avoiding threats or the use of force, showing complete respect to diplomatic-legal processes and peacefully resolving disputes in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS 1982).
Philippines-Japan:
Japan has been providing security assistance to the Philippines, including the transfer of defense equipment and technology. This support has been instrumental in enhancing the maritime capabilities of the Philippine Coast Guard and Navy.
Japan transferred the first of four long-range aerial surveillance radars to the Philippine Air Force (PAF) in December 2023, with the second following in April 2024. As an early-warning system, it will allow the PAF to identify, monitor and track multiple surface and aerial targets up to 463 kilometres. The very next month – in May 2024 – Manila and Tokyo signed a maritime security deal worth more than $500 million for Japan to construct five PCG capital ships in addition to providing a five-year integrated logistics support package.
The J/TPS-P14 radar serves as a long-range air surveillance radar system, the second of which has been handed over to the Philippine Air Force | Japanese Ministry of Defence
In July 2024, Manila and Tokyo signed the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), the latest defence agreement between the Philippines and Japan. The RAA grants the militaries of both states greater access to each other’s bases; makes it easier to transport weapons, logistics and supplies for exercises and humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR) operations. It still needs parliamentary approval from the Philippines and Japan.
Philippines-USA:
The Philippines is the largest recipient of American military aid in the Indo-Pacific. Manila is hoping the US Senate approves the Philippines Enhanced Resilience Act of 2024 (PERA) to provide the Philippines with $2.5 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) over a five-year period starting in 2025, with the annual $40 million FMF increasing to $500 million.
US NSA Jake Sullivan announced that Beijing understands Washington DC’s position on the application of the mutual defense treaty: the US will do whatever it takes to ensure the Philippines is able to resupply the BRP Sierra Madre in the Second Thomas Shoal. This statement by Sullivan came soon after the Philippines-China clash near the Ayungin Shoal.
Manila and Washington are expected to sign the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) by the end of 2024. It is currently in the last stage, all that is left is “final legal scrubbing clearance by the principals”. India and the US had signed the GSOMIA in 2002 to enhance interoperability between both militaries, the sale of high-end technology, the sharing of classified information from the US Government and American companies with India and India’s public sector companies. The Philippines and the US would follow the India-US arrangement.
The Philippines-US GSOMIA “… will formalise the sharing of critical security information between the treaty allies in a timely way and form protocols for safeguarding top-secret information or technology transfer.” According to Ashley Tellis (Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs and Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), the Philippines lacks Command, Control, Communications, Computers Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). Perhaps this is one reason why Manila and Washington are expected to sign this deal, to increase the Philippines’ situational awareness.
Manila got caught between Washington and Beijing during Covid-19, when China’s Sinovac vaccine was about to be deployed in the country. The US conducted Military Information Support Operations (MISO) to target a foreign audience by influencing its emotions, motives, objective reasoning, with the ultimate aim of influencing the behaviour of foreign governments, organisations, groups and individuals in alignment with its own objective. Through a social media campaign, the US targeted the Filipino public to raise doubts “… about the safety and efficacy of vaccines and other life-saving aid that was being supplied by China”.
This operation was Washington’s response to Beijing’s “… disinformation campaign to falsely blame the United States for the spread of COVID-19”. A senior Defense Department official confirmed that the US military does conduct propaganda to discredit the Sinovac vaccine in the developing world.
Conclusion
China’s aggressive maritime tactics in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea have significantly altered regional dynamics, prompting a concerted pushback from neighbouring countries and the international community. The escalating nature of Chinese aggression underscores the need for continued vigilance and cooperation to counter Beijing’s hegemonic ambitions.
Through increased public awareness, enhanced maritime security engagements, and robust international support, Southeast Asian nations are finding effective ways to resist China’s coercion. The ongoing efforts to foster a stable and rules-based order in the maritime domain are crucial for ensuring the sovereignty and security of all nations involved.
As the geopolitical landscape continues to evolve, it is imperative for regional and global powers to maintain a unified front in upholding international norms and deterring aggressive behaviour. The future stability of the Indian Ocean and South China Sea regions depends on sustained engagement, cooperation, and a steadfast commitment to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.
One key motivation for Beijing’s maritime aggression in the maritime theatre, is the untapped economic potential of the South China Sea. Due to the disputed nature of the waters in this region, the natural resources available are yet to be explored and utilised. This aspect is the last of the four articles discussed.
