Shenzhen: Can Rival Powers Find Common Ground
On November 19, Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Donald Trump will meet in Shenzhen on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. Beijing officially confirmed the meeting on November 16, highlighting ”world peace and stable relations between the major powers”. Behind this shared ambition, how far everyone is willing.
The question is how far everyone is willing to limit their freedom of action to achieve greater security?. Everyone may want to avoid an uncontrolled confrontation while continuing to pressure their opponents. In this narrow space, there is room for agreement.
Donald Trump wants to address the reduction of nuclear arsenals and war with Iran (according to US indications before the meeting). This can be seen as a search for results when US military power meets political obstacles. A discussion with Beijing and Moscow can open the door to negotiations. But it would also come at a price: securing their cooperation would require accommodating some of their requests.
For Xi Jinping, welcoming the other two leaders is already a diplomatic ”advantage”. China shows it is participating in international security and bringing rival powers together. China’s interest could be to make relations more predictable to protect its trade and development while maintaining its leverage.
Vladimir Putin may seek to have Russia recognized as an indispensable power in the international balance. The Kremlin insists on the symbolic significance of this meeting and hopes for a joint communiqué, though its adoption remains uncertain. Being at this table gives him ”political respectability”. Securing lasting concessions, however, would require much more than a photograph of three people.
The nuclear issue reveals well the difficulties of this meeting. The New START treaty, which regulated the strategic arsenals of the United States and Russia, expired on February 5, 2026. This disappearance makes it urgent to seek new verifiable limits, but the three countries do not start from the same situation.
Beijing believes its nuclear forces remain inferior to those of Washington and Moscow. In its official position presented in April, China deemed a trilateral disarmament negotiation premature and unjust. The disagreement concerns the distribution of efforts: who should reduce their forces, under what rules, and with what guarantees?
A breakthrough in Shenzhen could take a more modest form: establishing regular dialogue, improving crisis communication, or preparing technical discussions. Such measures would be useful, but they would require follow-up; without it, the conversation announcement would be meaningless.
Iran raises another difficulty: Washington might seek a Chinese and Russian contribution to de-escalation. Beijing and Moscow may wish to avoid a regional conflagration, while refusing to support US conditions. Their convergence would then focus on containing the crisis. This would leave open the essential question of what concessions each side is expected to make.
Above all, influence over Tehran does not mean an ability to decide for it. Iran retains its own objectives, constraints, and leverage. An agreement among the three leaders could facilitate a negotiation; its success would also depend on the actors directly concerned.
Ukraine recalls this same limit. On November 16, Trump announced he wanted to talk about it, even though his administration had previously said the issue would be excluded from trilateral discussions. A separate meeting between Trump and Putin is also scheduled, indicating that the outlines of the exchange remain fluid.
The meeting’s economic context is also important. Reuters reports that executives from major US and Chinese companies were present in Shenzhen. This presence reminds us that strategic rivalry coexists with major business interests. Stability benefits both economies without eliminating technological competition or security disagreements.
Under these conditions, the most likely outcome seems to be a limited agreement on further discussions. A more substantial agreement is still possible, but require concessions whose content and acceptability we do not yet know. The summit could produce a general declaration that each would then present according to their own interests.
To assess its results, it will therefore be necessary to examine the specific commitments: a timetable, designated focal points, verifiable measures and follow-up given in the following weeks. Public statements will help identify intentions. Decisions will show how far leaders are willing to go.
Shenzhen can open a period of dialogue between rival powers. Its value will be measured by their ability to make crises less dangerous. The question will be the price everyone is committed to paying for this stability.
