Why Washington’s Iran Policy Can Look Coherent

Many people describe Donald Trump’s foreign policy as inconsistent. The style is loud, the messages are often contradictory, and the tone can change overnight. But when you look at the US approach toward Iran’s ruling system (“the mullahs”), a different picture appears. What looks like chaos can be read as a method: apply maximum pressure, keep the other side uncertain, and leave only two doors open—deal, or danger.

The approach of “heat and cold” is not arbitrary. The “heat” is the promise of diplomacy: signals that talks are possible, that a deal could happen quickly, and that sanctions could be lifted if Iran accepts strict conditions. This side of the policy is meant to create temptation and division inside the Iranian system. It targets the pragmatists, the economic elites, and parts of the bureaucracy who fear collapse more than humiliation. “If you compromise, you may survive” is the implicit message.

The “cold” is the opposite: military deployments, harsh warnings, sanctions, and isolation. This side is meant to raise the cost of delay. Iran has long used negotiations to buy time—time for its nuclear program, time for missile development, time to rebuild proxies in the region, and time to wait for a more favorable US administration. The cold signals are designed to cut that timeline. They say, “The clock is no longer yours.”

When seen in this light, the US approach makes sense since it targets a particular Iranian conduct: strategic patience. Washington is working to eliminate Iran’s comfort zone, which allows Tehran to simultaneously negotiate, threaten, and carry out its main goals. Heat provides a way out, whereas cold blocks the path.

The next step is the introduction of a possible regime change, and it makes the logic even clearer but also more dangerous. Regime change language can serve as a ceiling, not as a plan. It is the “maximum threat” behind the negotiations. The message becomes, “If you think you can resist forever, you are wrong. Your survival is in jeopardy. This type of rhetoric is meant to force quick choices inside the regime and inside Iran’s elite networks. It also speaks to the street: the United States is not only talking to the leadership; it is watching the internal balance of power.

In that sense, regime change is not necessarily the main objective. It can be a lever. It tells Iran that the US is not only bargaining over centrifuges and missiles, but over the future structure of power. It is a way to pressure Tehran into accepting terms it would otherwise reject.

However, this lever has a high cost. The more Washington speaks about regime change, the more Iran’s leaders believe that any compromise is a trap. If the goal is to weaken or remove them, why negotiate honestly? In such a situation, the regime’s instinct is survival. Survival means repression at home, tighter control over elites, and sometimes escalation abroad to prove strength. Regime change talk can therefore reduce the chances of a diplomatic “off-ramp,” even if the US still wants a deal.

There is also the coalition problem. Maximum pressure works best when allies support it. Some partners may accept tough sanctions and military signals, but fear the chaos of collapse: civil conflict, fragmentation, refugee flows, and uncontrolled armed groups. If allies suspect the US is aiming for regime change, they may hesitate. That hesitation gives Iran space. And Iran always looks for space.

So the key question is not whether the policy is coherent. It can be coherent. The key question is: coherent toward what end?

Two endgames are possible. The first is a hard deal: force Iran to accept deep limits not only on its nuclear program but also on missiles and regional networks. In this scenario, regime change is mostly a threat to speed up concessions. The second endgame is attrition: push the regime toward internal fracture by tightening pressure until the system breaks. This is a more radical path and carries far greater uncertainty.

Trump’s style—heat and cold—fits both. That is why it works as coercion and why it can also lead to miscalculation. Iran may believe the US is heading for regime change even if the US mainly wants a deal. Or Washington may believe Tehran will yield when Tehran is preparing to absorb pain and escalate.

What looks incoherent can be a structured pressure strategy. But the moment regime change enters the picture, coherence comes with a higher risk: it makes the game clearer and therefore compromise harder.